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In this exploratory essay, I would like to argue that Wang Yang-ming’s 
(Shou-jen 1472-1529) Four-Sentence Teaching, as interpreted 
by one of his immediate successors, comes very close to the spirit of Ch’an 
(Zen). This certainly raises the intriguing question, “How Buddhistic is 
Wang Yang-ming?” Instead of addressing myself to a general interpretation 
of Yang-ming’s spiritual orientation, however, I will confine my efforts to an 
analysis of the philosophical import of the Four-Sentence Teaching. Although 
I still maintain that Yang-ming by a conscious choice clearly identified him­
self with the Confucian Way, I am now convinced that a sophisticated appreci­
ation of his mode of thinking also requires an investigation of its relationship 
to Ch’an. Without such an investigation, I would contend, it is impossible 
to probe the subtleness of Yang-ming’s teachings, especially those just prior 
to his departure for Ssu-en and T’ien-chou in 1527. Of course by focusing my 
attention on this aspect of Yang-ming’s religio-philosophy, I do not mean to 
rule out the possibility that in other aspects he might have been influenced 
more deeply by Taoism. My central concern here is simply to present an in­
quiry into one of his most significant attempts at the formulation of his ideas, 
which, in my opinion, particularly illustrates his Ch’an-like wisdom.
The question whether the mind-in-itself (bsin-t’i /<2tf), intention (i j£), 
liang-cbih and thing (wu #7) are all beyond the distinction of good and 
evil is a basic ground of contention between Yang-ming’s two prominent 
disciples, Ch’ien Te-hung (Hsii-shan 1496-1574) and Wang Chi
3E& (Lung-hsi 1489-1583). The whole issue centers around Yang-
ming’s famous Four-Sentence Teaching:1
1 See note on page 46.
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There is neither good nor evil in the mind-in-itself.
There are both good and evil in the activation of intentions.
Knowing good and evil is the [faculty] of liang-chih.
Doing good and removing evil is the rectification of things.
While Ch’ien Te-hung accepts the Teaching as the Master’s doctrine in four 
axioms, Lung-hsi doubts that it is the ultimate formulation of Yang-ming’s 
view on the matter. He argues that if the mind-in-itself is without good and 
evil, then the intention, knowledge, and thing should all be without good and 
evil. On the other hand, if the intention is not devoid of good and evil, there 
must be good and evil in the mind-in-itself. Lung-hsi’s argument points to 
a fundamental problem in Yang-ming’s religio-philosophy.
It should be noted that underlying the Four-Sentence Teaching is a set of 
assumptions which first appeared in the Great Learning^Ta-bsiieb^i^. Actually 
the four sentences are structurally comparable to the first four “steps” of the 
eightfold process in the Great Learning.2 In a separate study, I have character­
ized them as the “inner dimension” of self-cultivation (briu-sben Jf), as 
contrasted with its “outer manifestation” such as regulating the family 
cbia ordering the state (cbin-kuo and bringing peace throughout 
the world (fittg ti3en-hsia ^^T). The first four steps consist of (i) investi­
gation of things (ko-wu (2) extension of knowledge Qhib-cbib £££□), (3) 
2 The eightfold process of the Great Learning appears as follows: “The ancients who 
wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. 
Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those 
who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who 
wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished 
to rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make 
their wills sincere would first extend their knowledge. The extension of knowledge con­
sists in the investigation of things.” See Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Cbinete Pbilotopby 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 86.
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sincerity of the will Qtfeng-i ifcft), and (4) rectification of the mind (cbeng- 
bsin xE<2). If we focus our attention on the wording of the Chinese text, it is 
clear that the key concepts are identical to those of the Four-Sentence Teach­
ing: hsin (mind), i (will, intention), (knowledge), and zw (thing). Since 
Yang-ming perceives ko-wu (investigation of things) as the rectification of 
things and cbib-chib (extension of knowledge) as the extension tfliang-cbib, the 
interpreted meanings of the four steps in the Great Learning and those of the 
Four-Sentence Teaching are virtually the same. It should also be noted that 
historically the formulation of the Four-Sentence Teaching occurred within 
months of Yang-mi ng’s Inquiry into the Great Learning QTa-bsiieb wen 
this further suggests that there must be a close affinity between them.
To put the discussion in its original context, it is essential that we focus 
more sharply on Lung-hsi’s interpretive position. The following quotation 
seems particularly relevant:
The Master [Yang-ming] sets up his teaching in response to con­
tingent situations. This is called expedience Qctfuan-fa M&). We 
must not be attached to its fixed formulation. Substance, function, 
manifestation, and subtlety are the same incipience &)• The 
mind, the intention, liang-chib, and the thing are all one event. If we 
realize that the mind is the mind without good and evil, then the 
intention is the intention without good and evil, the knowing [of 
liang-chib] is the knowing without good and evil, and the thing is 
the thing without good and evil. For the mind without mindfulness 
is concealed in profundity, the intention without intentness is round 
and perfect in its response, the knowing without knowledge is 
tranquil in its substance, and the thing without thingness is un­
fathomable in its function.3 4
3 According to Ch’ien Te-hung’s preface to the Great Learning, it was recorded by 
Yang-ming at the request of his students prior to his departure for the military campaign 
in Ssu-T‘ien. Since the imperial order arrived in the fifth month of 1527 and Yang-ming 
embarked on the journey in the ninth month of the same year, it must have occurred 
within months of the historical debate on the Four-Sentence Teaching. See his
in Tang-ming dftian-ibu Qsu-pupei-yao nJQ, 34: i6b-l8b.
4 Wang Lung-bfi yu-Ju (reprint; Taipei: Kuang-wen < 31 Book Co., i960),
i:ia.
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Lung-hsi’s argument can be understood through an inquiry into the mind- 
in-itself. If we take the concept of mind as our point of departure, we are 
bound to have some definite ideas about the meanings of intention, liang-chib, 
and thing. The term biin-ebib-t’i is often rendered as “the substance
of the mind.” Professor Mou Tsung-san of New Asia College suggests
that it is better translated as “mind-in-itself.”5 6The reason should become clear 
later.
5 Mou Tsung-san, “The Immediate Successor of Wang Yang-ming: Wang Lung-hsi
and His Theory of ssu-wu” Philosophy East and West, XXIII, Nos. I and 2 (January and April, 
1973), P- I04> note 2. For a more extensive analysis of the same issue, see his “ Wang- 
bsiieb ti ftn-buayi fa-cban in Hsin-ya Sbu-yuan bsiieb-sbu nien-k?an
14 (i97i)> PP- 93-94-
6 The term was actually used by Yang-ming himself; see Cb’uan-bsi lu, in Yang-ming 
clfuan-sbu, 1:2b.
To say that the mind-in-itself is beyond good and evil is to maintain that 
concepts such as good and evil are simply inapplicable to the “reality” of the 
mind because as such the mind cannot be differentiated into discrete entities 
and then subsumed under a relative category. It is certainly legitimate, and 
not only in the tradition of Chu Hsi (1130-1200), to describe the human 
mind Qen-bfin AXk)as laden with selfish desires and so dangerously prone to 
evildoing, but to designate the mind-in-itself as either good or evil is to negate 
the basic assumption that it is “supremely good” (cbih-sban To char­
acterize supreme goodness as a form of good is to relativize an ultimate concept 
by a dichotomous scheme. This may not be as absurd as the idea of the “evil 
mind-in-itself” but it is equally misleading.
For the sake of expedience, we may define this approach to the mind as a 
“negative” method: clothing it in the state of nothingness. To say that the 
mind is being clothed in the state of nothingness is, however, not to suggest 
that the mind is being defined in terms of an ontological nonreality. The 
question whether the mind-in-itself is an ultimate reality or is, in the final 
analysis, a nonbeing should not concern us here. At issue is, given the trans­
cendental nature of the mind-in-itself, what mode of comprehension is most 
suitable. Suppose the mind-in-itself is an ultimate reality rather than a non- 
being, does it necessarily follow that it is good, evil, or simply neutral?
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According to Lung-hsi’s contention, which in this connection is in complete 
agreement with the first line of the Four-Sentence Teaching, it is senseless 
to describe the mind-in-itself in such terms; for as soon as this is done the mind- 
in-itself is inadequately understood as an empirical mind.
While the empirical mind manifests itself in concrete form, the mind-in- 
itself, as a substantial being, never manifests itself in concrete form. To the 
mind-in-itself, concrete forms are unnecessary attachments; they signify 
neither what it is nor how it really functions. It is in this sense that Lung-hsi 
defines the mind-in-itself as the mind that can manifest itself without the 
form of the mind. Of course tpu-hsin chib bsin can be grammatically
rendered as “the mind of no-mind.”7 But it is vitally important to note that 
“no mind” here specifically refers to the ability of the mind to function without 
“mindful” traces of its functioning. Understandably such a mind is beyond the 
distinction of good and evil.
7 The term has been rendered as “the mind of no-mind”; sec Chang Chung-yuan, 
“ ‘The Essential Source of Identity* in Wang Lung-hsi’s Philosophy,” Philosophy East and
Wil
8 See Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living., p. 77. Some changes have 
been made.
The mind-in-itselfso perceived is, I believe, in perfect accord with the thrust 
of Yang-ming’s other teachings. The Master once remarked:
However, if one does not realize that the mind-in-itself is devoid of 
all things [that is, completely pure and open], and focuses his mind 
solely on loving good and hating evil, he will merely add to his mind 
this much of his own intention and therefore his mind will not be 
broad and impartial. Only when one does not make any special effort 
whatsoever to like or dislike, as described in the Book of History, can 
the mind be in its original substance.8
There are other comparable examples in which the mind-in-itself is also 
approached by the Master in terms of the “negative” method. Yang-ming 
once used an analogy to illustrate his point. He stated that like the eye, the 
mind-in-itself is absolutely intolerant to the slightest presence of dust. It 
matters very little what the quality of the dust is. As gold dust is as dis­
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turbing to the eye as any kind of dust, so good and evil intentions are equally 
disturbing to the mind-in-itself.9 In short, Yang-ming maintains that the mind- 
in-itself is without any trace of good or evil. Only then can it be understood as 
“supremely good.”
9 See C&uan-bsi lu, J; 26a.
Comparably liang-cbib can also be understood as beyond good and evil. In 
Yang-ming’s thinking, liang-M is not only the ultimate ground of self­
realization but also the primordial strength for self-cultivation. It is not 
simply knowing as a form of cognitive understanding but acting in the sense 
of experiential enlightening which necessarily brings about self-transformation 
at the deepest level. Knowing so conceived is certainly not restricted to em­
pirical knowledge. It is not just to know an object, no matter how compre­
hensive the sensory perception is meant to be. To know an object presupposes 
a spatial distance between the knower and the object under investigation and 
a temporal gap between the commencement and the completion of the investi­
gating procedure. It requires analytical methods and experimental skills. To be 
sure, it can also affect one’s way of life. But the knowing of liang-cbib is in itself 
a creative act. It is the basis upon which genuine action can be completed. 
Similarly, acting in this connection is not merely praxis. It is neither the 
practice of an external art nor the conduct of an acquired habit. The acting of 
liang-cbib necessarily involves a profound self-awareness. For only with it can 
true intellectual self-definition be realized. The unity of knowing and acting 
is a defining characteristic of liang-M.
This leads us to the corollary that liang-M is both a substantial being and 
a transforming activity. It is on the one hand the innermost core of sensibility 
and on the other the most profound source of strengdi for self-cultivation. 
Far from being an external, abstract idea, it manifests itself as an internal, 
concrete reality, indeed as the center of creativity. To be sure liang-M is not 
separate from sensory' perceptions, but neither can it be fully appreciated in 
terms of ordinary experiences alone. Its “integrity,” so to speak, can never be 
reduced to what the Neo-Confucian scholars called “the knowledge of hearing 
and seeing.” It is probably in this sense that Yang-ming characterized liang- 
cbib as “the refined spirituality of creative transformation” Qsao-bua chib cbing-
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Actually, liang-cbib is not only an anthropological concept, 
restricted to the definition of human beings; it is the ultimate reality of the 
myriad things Qpan-vu as well. Indeed, liang-cbib makes it possible for 
heaven and earth to become intelligible and meaningful processes of existence. 
Accordingly liang-cbib was designated by Yang-ming as the “original sub­
stance” (pen-fi of the mind; it is, in the last analysis, a different mode 
of expressing the mind-in-itself. Understandably liang-cbib must not be con­
ceived as either good or evil, for like the mind-in-itself it is supremely good.
If the mind-in-itself is beyond good and evil, how can intention be con­
sidered as having good and evil? In what sense is Lung-hsi justified in claiming 
that “if we realize that the mind is the mind without good and evil, then the 
intention is the intention without good and evil”? The underlying question is 
of course that of the relationship between the mind and intention. One way of 
answering the question is to define intention as the directionality of the mind. 
Intention so defined is an activation pointing toward a concrete manifestation 
of the mind. The inseparableness of intention and the mind thus resembles 
that of waves and the ocean. If the ocean is beyond good and evil, it seems 
quite misleading to suggest that the waves themselves, as natural activities of 
the ocean, are either good or evil. Thus intention is, like the mind-in-itself, 
also a transcendental concept, and Lung-hsi is therefore justified in asserting 
that intention is neither good nor evil. Correspondingly, if liang-cbib is beyond 
good and evil, how can the thing be considered as having good and evil? This 
raises the question of the specific relationship between the thing and liang- 
cbib. If the thing originates from liang-cbib, it is inconceivable that the thing of 
liang-cbib is not also supremely good. This line of reasoning seems in perfect 
accord with Yang-ming’s teaching.
In fact Yang-ming often conceptualizes a thing in terms of the self-expression 
of liang-cbib. Comparable to the inseparability of the mind-in-itself and its 
intention, the thing as a concrete manifestation of liang-cbib is necessarily an 
integral part of liang-cbib's self-definition. As a result, Lung-hsi’s insistence that 
if we realize that the mind is the mind without good and evil, then the thing is 
the thing without good and evil is not at all in conflict with what the Master *
10 The same term is translated by Wing-tsit Chan as “the spirit of creation.” Sec 
ibid., p. 216, and C&uan-bii lu, 3: 26a-b.
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himself clearly advocates. The following formulation by Yang-ming is singular­
ly pertinent:
Principle (li Jl) is one and no more. In terms of its condensation and 
concentration [in the individual] it is called the nature (bring ti). In 
terms of the master of this condensation and concentration it is 
called the mind. In terms of the manifestation and activation of 
this master it is called the intention. In terms of the enlightening 
awareness of this manifestation and activation it is called knowledge. 
In terms of the affection and response of this enlightening awareness 
it is called the thing.11
11 See Yang-ming’s letter in reply to Lo Cheng-an in CHuan-bn lut 2:28a. Cf.
Chan’s translation, ibid., p. 161.
The whole discussion here is obviously at the transcendental level. In the 
light of Lung-hsi’s insights, it can be easily argued that the mind without the 
forms of mind signifies the manner in which the mind masters human nature; 
it is precisely because the condensed and concentrated principle is deeply 
preserved in human nature that the mind can be said to have been “concealed 
in profundity.” Similarly, the intention without the form of intention signifies 
the manner in which the intention manifests and activates the mind; since the 
intention, like the waves of the ocean, emerges naturally as the inner demand 
of the mind itself, its response can be said to be “round and perfect.” Know­
ing without the form of knowing thus signifies the manner in which intention 
becomes acutely aware of its own orientation; if intention is understood as 
the directionality of the mind, knowledge pertaining to the self-awareness of 
the mind can therefore be described as “tranquil in itself.” Accordingly, the 
thing without the form of thing signifies the manner in which liang-cbib acts 
in concrete situations; not being a fixed object, the thing as the affection of 
liang-chib is indeed “unfathomable in its function.”
Lung-hsi’s approach to the Four-Sentence Teaching has been characterized 
as “fourfold nothingness” (ssu-wu E9&). In other words, the four root concepts 
are all perceived as in a state of nothing. It is vitally important to note that 
the term “nothing” in this particular connection is functionally defined. It 
actually means, in a transcendental sense, that mind-in-itself, liang-cbib, inten­
39
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
tion, and thing are all freed from attachments. The cultivation of the mind can 
be fully realized only when the effort is not being “mindfully” attached. 
Likewise, the intention is truly genuine when it is manifested as if with no 
intentness. Just as the most profound knowing has no trace of knowledge, the 
perfect thing completely delivers itself from thingness.
However, a crucial distinction must be made. While the mind-in-itself and 
liang-ebib are absolutely beyond good and evil, the intention and the thing can 
very well be analyzed in terms of good and evil. Although it makes sense to 
say that the intention of the mind-in-itself and the thing of liang-ebib are su­
premely good, it is difficult to maintain that intentions and things are always 
beyond good and evil. Even in a state of nothing, the level at which the mind- 
in-itself transcends mindfulness is fundamentally different from the level at 
which the intention is said to be without intentness. Correspondingly, the 
“unknowingness” of liang-ebib in no way resembles the “nothingness” of the 
thing. While liang-ebib always knows without the form of knowledge, only 
when the thing is conceived as the affection of liang-ebib can it be characterized 
as a thing without thingness.
In the actual process of self-cultivation, however, the thing is often perceived 
as an intended object, locatable in a concrete situation. It is neither contentless 
nor formless. The tangibility of a thing is so central to self-cultivation that 
to deny it is to undermine the very basis upon which the conscious effort of 
self-cultivation is focused. In this context, to deprive a thing of its thingness, 
as it were, is tantamount to relinquishing the whole enterprise of self-culti­
vation.
This brings us back to the basic question, “What is a thing?” If it is con­
ceptualized as an inseparable manifestation of liang-chib^ it can very” well be 
conceived as a kind of “transcendental affection,” completely beyond the 
dichotomy of good and evil. As a transcendental affection, the thing is, in the 
last analysis, without thingness. How, then, can the effort of rectification be 
applied? To rectify a thing certainly does not mean to “rectify” the transcen­
dental affection of liang-ebib. It is neither desirable nor possible to exert moral 
effort upon liang-ebib itself. To be sure, liang-ebib can and should be “extended” 
(cbib R), which in essence implies a process of self-manifestation. But it is 
misleading to suggest that the extension or manifestation of liang-ebib must 
also be subjected to a rectifying procedure.
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However, if the thing is conceptualized as an intended object, it cannot 
avoid the judgments of good and evil. Nor can it be exempted from any 
moral scrutiny. It is in this sense that the effort of self-cultivation, known as 
the rectification of things, becomes relevant. From this perspective, liang-cbib^ 
which functions as the basis for rectifying the mind’s intended objects, must 
itself make clear differentiations between right and wrong. The thing which 
needs to be rectified inevitably has the form of a thing; and the liang-cbib 
which evaluates human affairs cannot eliminate the form of knowledge. Thus, 
in a state of being, neither the thing nor liang-cbib is beyond good and evil. 
For both of them are “located” in concrete relationships.
Analogously, when the intention is conceptualized as the directionality of 
the mind-in-itself, it is inconceivable that it can be further refined. Indeed, how 
can the effort of making the intention genuine be applied, if the intention in 
question is, in the last analysis, without intentness? However, if intention is 
thought to be aroused by an object, it becomes imperative that the aroused 
intention be judged in reference to its intended object. Self-cultivation, as 
the effort of making the will (intention) sincere, immediately becomes per­
tinent. To make the intention sincere is to exert conscious effort whereby the 
intention can eventually become truthful to the original substance of the 
mind. From this perspective, the mind itself is not necessarily devoid of good 
and evil either. The mind with the form of the mind must choose to ally with 
the good so that the intention, despite its attachment to the thing, can remain 
sincere, truthful and genuine.
In contrast with the fourfold nothingness, this approach to the Four- 
Sentence Teaching is known as the “fourfold beingness” (ssu-yu £9^). In other 
words, the four root concepts are all perceived as in a state of being. Since 
the thing, having a concrete structure of its own, is not necessarily in the right 
place, it has to be rectified. Moral effort is then the prerequisite for “removing 
evil and doing good” so that the intended object can be properly situated. This 
is predicated on the ability of liang-cbib to differentiate good from evil. Having 
the form of knowing, liang-cbib is itself inevitably fixed in a definite function. 
If we pursue this line of inquiry, as soon as the intention is activated, good or 
evil unavoidably comes into being. Despite the assertion that the mind-in- 
itself is supremely good, so far as actual moral practice is concerned, the mind 
also needs to be constantly “cultivated.”
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If we commence self-cultivation by the rectification of things, we can con­
ceptualize the Four-Sentence Teaching as a process toward a deepened subjec­
tivity. The first step, from the rectification of things to liang-cbib^ is to syn­
thesize discrete events of self-cultivation in order to arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of the “intellectual intuition” upon which all moral efforts are 
based. Next, while liang-cbib as a form of knowing is a reflection on accom­
plished facts, the intention signifies an incipient tendency toward a concrete 
action. To be aware of the good and evil inherent in the activation of the 
intention is therefore a more subtle mode of self-cultivation. Finally, it is the 
“substance” of the mind that ultimately determines the quality of one’s being. 
Unless moral effort can eventually penetrate, so to speak, the deepest layer of 
human sensitivity, self-cultivation is still incomplete. Since, in a practical sense, 
there is always latitude for a further refinement of one’s inner sensitivity, the 
process toward an ever deepened subjectivity is therefore unceasing.
Does this emphasis on self-cultivation as a lifelong commitment signify a 
gradual, piecemeal teaching on enlightenment? The answer must be in the 
negative. For the ultimate ground as well as the actual faculty of self-cultivation 
is liang-cbib. If self-cultivation commences with the rectification of things, it 
is because liang-cbib by knowing good and evil can exert moral effort to do good 
and remove evil. There is neither external principle to guide nor outside power 
to initiate moral practice. Both the ontological basis and the real strength of 
self-cultivation are inherent in liang-cbib. Furthermore, if self-cultivation 
commences with the activation of intention, the ultimate ground and the 
actual faculty of making the intention genuine are both located in the mind- 
in-itself. Indeed, the only possibility of asserting moral effort to redirect the 
incipient tendency of the intention is by the self-awakening of the mind. 
Without this, the intention as it is activated by the thing will escape the moral 
scrutiny of one’s inner sensibility. As a result, the intention is no longer a 
genuine expression of the mind but an attachment to an external object.
The Four-Sentence Teaching so conceived can thus be interpreted as in­
dicating two parallel processes: (i) from the thing to liang-chihy and (2) from 
the intention to the mind-in-itself. In either case, the central concern is sharply 
focused upon the subtle manifestations of the mind. It is in this sense that to 
rectify things, to extend liang-cbib^ and to make the intention genuine are all 
modes of cultivating the mind. In Yang-ming’s own expression, this is an 
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attempt at “pulling up the root and stopping up the source” (pa-pen sai-yuan 
If we take this approach seriously, Lung-hsi’s critique of the so- 
called fourfold beingness becomes readily comprehensible:
The nature ordained by heaven is purely and supremely good. 
Wonderfully affecting and responding, its incipient manifestation is 
naturally unceasing. There is no good to be named. Of course there 
is originally no evil, but even good cannot dwell in it. Therefore it 
is called beyond good and evil. If there is either good or evil, it is 
because the intention is activated by the thing. Without being a 
“self-so flow” (tzu-jan liu-hsing § it becomes attached to a
state of being. That which is “self-so flow” moves without motion. 
That which is attached to a state of being moves with motion. 
Intention is what the mind manifests. If the intention is the inten­
tion of good and evil, liang-cbib and the thing are simultaneously in 
the state of being. Neither can the mind be said to be in the state of 
nothing.12 3
12 IbuL, p. 117.
13 This is actually a continuation of Lung-hsi’s statement mentioned in note 4. See 
VKang Lung-hsi yii-lu, l:ia-b.
14 Ctfuan-bsi lu, 1:22a. Sec Chan’s translation in Instruction for Practical Living, pp. 63-64.
It should be pointed out that Yang-ming himself has made similar claims: 
“The state of having neither good nor evil is that of principle in tranquillity. 
Good and evil appear when the vital force (dfi &) is perturbed. If the vital 
force is not perturbed, there is neither good nor evil, and this is called the 
supremely good.”14 An exceedingly interesting exchange between Yang-ming 
and Lung-hsi recorded by Ch’ien Te-hung further illustrates that this must 
have been a position on which both were agreed:
Our Teacher had already embarked on his journey of military cam­
paign to Ssu-en and 'Tien-chou. Ju-chung (the courtesy name 
of Lung-hsi) and I [Ch’ien Te-hung] followed after him and finally bid 
him farewell at Yen-t’an. Ju-chung raised the question of the Buddhist 
teaching on the reality and illusion of dharma. The Teacher said, 
“With the mind, all is reality (sbib *); without the mind, all is 
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illusion (huan fff). With the mind, all is illusion; without the mind, 
all is reality.” Ju-chung remarked, “‘With the mind, all is reality; 
without the mind, all is illusion’ refers to conscious effort (kung-fu 
X^.) from the viewpoint of original substance (pen-t’i ^tt). ‘With 
the mind, all is illusion; without the mind, all is reality’ refers to 
original substance from the viewpoint of conscious effort.” The 
Teacher approved his interpretation. At the time I was not yet able 
to comprehend its meaning. After several years of endeavor, I have 
now come to the belief that original substance and conscious effort 
are one. However, our Teacher uttered those words at that time 
incidentally in answer to a question. There is no need for us Con­
fucians in our instructional efforts to formulate our doctines by 
relying upon this [Buddhist insight].15
15 Cb'uan-bsi lut 3:26b. Cf. Chan’s translation in Instruction for Practical Livings p. 258. 
In Lung-hsi’s biography, the following statement is recorded in reference to this particular 
exchange:
The mind is neither being nor nonbeing; dharmas are neither real nor illusory. As 
soon as one is attached to being, nonbeing, reality, or illusion, one has already fallen 
into the trap of a “fragmented routine” Quan-dPang^1py This is like juggling with 
balls. They are neither attached nor departed from any one place. Therefore it is called 
the “primordial unity” (yuan-Pung
See “Wang Lung-hsi hsien-sheng chuan in Wang Lung-bsiyi-lu, p.i.
Lung-hsi’s perceptive grasp of Yang-ming’s insight is really phenomenal. 
The remarkable rapport between them, which is also borne out by numerous 
other examples in the Instructions for Practical Living (Cb'iian-hsi lu 
seems somewhat beyond the comprehension of even Ch’ien Te-hung, one of 
Yang-ming’s most trusted and respected disciples. To be sure, what Yang- 
ming and Lung-hsi both shared as an inner experience was the absolute unity 
of original substance and conscious effort. But the unity can be perceived 
from two significantly different viewpoints. If self-cultivation commences with 
the mind-in-itself, original substance entails conscious effort. This is known as 
a form of a priori learning chib bsiich For the “rectification”
of the mind, as a holistic attempt at sudden enlightenment, is not empirically 
definable. The concept of rectification in this connection is fundamentally
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different from that in the “rectification of things.” To rectify a thing is to 
exert conscious effort upon an intended object, but to “rectify” the mind is 
simply to manifest the original substance of it. Since the mind, as the inner­
most subjectivity, can never be “rectified” as an object, the rectification of 
the mind actually means the self-awakening of the mind. Once the mind-in- 
itself is fully awakened, the intention becomes a “self-so flow” and the thing, 
as where the intention dwells, becomes properly situated. This certainly is not 
empirical learning; in a strict sense, it is not even learnable. “With the mind, 
all is reality; without the mind all is illusion” thus signifies the self-awakening 
of the mind.
On the other hand, if self-cultivation commences with the intention, con­
scious effort is an indispensable but not a sufficient ground for recovering the 
original substance of the mind. This is known as a form of a posteriori learning 
(bou-fien chib bsiieh For the intention, as activated by the thing,
must be made sincere by empirically verifiable moral decisions. As Lung-hsi 
has pointed out, when the intention is no longer a “self-so flow,” it becomes 
attached to a state of being. As a result, it cannot transcend the dichotomy 
of good and evil. Moral decisions are thus required to free the intention from 
being fixed in the thing; only then can it again become a genuine manifesta­
tion of the mind-in-itself. This necessitates efforts such as the rectification of 
things. Actually doing good and removing evil is a concrete way of making the 
intention sincere. In a deeper sense, however, unless the mind is “rectified,” 
there is no assurance that the intention can remain sincere. To say that sinceri­
ty of the intention is dependent upon the rectification of the mind implies 
that moral efforts can be exerted upon the mind. On the surface, this seems 
diametrically opposed to our previous assertion that the mind can never be 
rectified as an object. To be sure, in a priori learning, it is meaningless to speak 
of the rectification of the mind. But in a posteriori learning, since the mind is 
in a state of being, it cannot be devoid of forms. In fact, that which is being 
rectified is not the mind-in-itself but the form of the mind. “With the mind, 
all is illusion; without the mind, all is reality” thus signifies the conscious at­
tempt of the mind to liberate itself from its own form.
Of course, Lung-hsi was disposed to practice a priori learning. He strongly 
believed that the ultimate meaning of the Four-Sentence Teaching is to be 
sought in the mind without the form of the mind. Indeed, the mind but not
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the mind of mindfulness is the mind-in-itself. This comes close to the idea that 
“prajna but not prajna is called frajna” It may not be farfetched to suggest 
that Lung-hsi, through an experiential understanding of his Master’s spiritual 
orientation, was able to push Yang-ming’s Four-Sentence Teaching to its 
logical conclusion. It should be noted that Yang-ming himself fully endorsed 
Lung-hsi’s interpretation, although he still insisted upon the validity of the 
four axioms in their original formulation. It seems also that Yang-ming was 
quite aware of the Buddhist implications of Lung-hsi’s attempt to put the 
four root concepts in a state of nothing. Yang-ming’s willingness to answer 
Lung-hsi’s questions about the reality or illusion of dharma and the manner 
in which he actually dealt with the issue further indicate that he was not at 
all reluctant to confront Buddhist ideas. Indeed, Yang-ming seems to have 
taken a great delight in formulating religio-philosophical insights in Buddhist 
terminology.
Therefore I would not object to the assertion that Yang-ming, despite his 
early intellectual self-definition as a Confucian, was throughout his life deeply 
inspired by Buddhist ideas. His Four-Sentence Teaching and many of his en­
counters with Lung-hsi point to a dimension of his religio-philosophy which 
can well be explored in the context of Ch’an. Nor would I insist upon calling 
Lung-hsi a “Confucian,” simply because he was truthful to Yang-ming’s 
spiritual orientation. Although I cannot be certain that Lung-hsi’s “Ch’an- 
like” wisdom was necessarily a reflection of his specific predilection for 
Buddhism, I am absolutely sure that he, like his Master, never felt at home with 
the scholar-officials in Ming society who jealously defended the Confucian 
Tao against Buddhist heterodoxy for the wrong reasons. Ch’ien Te-hung was 
obviously concerned about Confucian appropriation of Buddhist insights. 
Had he mastered the drift of Yang-ming’s teaching as perceptively as 
Lung-hsi, he might have enthusiastically lent himself to such a creative adap­
tation.
Note: A very vivid account of the original controversy over the Four-Sentence Teaching is 
found in the Instruction for Practical Living (UPiian-bsi lu W recorded by Ch’ien Te- 
hung. Since the main focus of my analysis in the present study is on the interpretive posi­
tion of Wang Lung-hsi, it seems appropriate to quote in full what Ch’ien believed to have
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transpired in the discussion. The following translation is taken from Professor Wing-tsit 
Chan’s pioneering work:
In the ninth month of the sixth year of Chia-ching [1527] our Teacher had been 
called from retirement and appointed to subdue once more the rebellion in Ssu-en 
and T’ien-chou [when the earlier expedition under another official had failed]. 
As he was about to start, Ju-chung [Wang Chi] and I [Ch’ien Te-hung] discussed 
learning. He repeated the words of the Teacher’s instructions as follows:
“In the original substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and evil.
When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists.
The faculty of innate knowledge is to know good and evil. 
The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil.” 
I asked, “What do you think this means?”
Ju-chung said, “This is perhaps not the final conclusion. If we say that in the 
original substance of the mind there is no distinction between good and evil, then 
there must be no such distinction in the will, in knowledge, and in things. If we 
say that there is a distinction between good and evil in the will, then in the final 
analysis there must also be such a distinction in the substance of the mind.”
I said, “The substance of the mind is the nature endowed in us by Heaven, and is 
originally neither good nor evil. But because we have a mind dominated by habits, 
we see in our thoughts a distinction between good and evil. The work of the in­
vestigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the sincerity of the will, the 
rectification of the mind, and the cultivation of the personal life is aimed precisely 
at recovering that original nature and substance. If there were no good or evil to 
start with, what would be the necessity of such effort?”
That evening we sat down beside the Teacher at the T’ien-ch’iian Bridge. Each 
stated his view and asked to be corrected. The Teacher said, “I am going to leave 
now. I wanted to have you come and talk this matter through. You two gentlemen 
complement each other very well, and should not hold on to one side. Here I deal 
with two types of people. The man of sharp intelligence apprehends straight from 
the source. The original substance of the human mind is in fact crystal-clear without 
any impediment and is the equilibrium before the feelings are aroused. The man of 
sharp intelligence has accomplished his task as soon as he has apprehended the original 
substance, penetrating the self, other people, and things internal and things external 
all at the same time. On the other hand, there are inevitably those whose minds 
are dominated by habits so that the original substance of the mind is obstructed. I 
therefore teach them definitely and sincerely to do good and remove evil in their 
will and thoughts. When they become expert at the task and the impurities of the 
mind are completely eliminated, the original substance of the mind will become 
wholly clear. Ju-chung*s view is the one I use in dealing with the man of sharp 
intelligence. Te-hung’s view is for the second type. If you two gentlemen use your
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views interchangeably, you will be able to lead all people—of the highest, average, 
and lowest intelligence—to the truth. If each of you holds on to one side, right here 
you will err in handling properly the different types of man and each in his own way 
will fail to understand fully the substance of the Way.”
After a while he said again, “From now on whenever you discuss learning with 
friends be sure not to lose sight of my basic purpose.
In the original substance of the mind there is no distinction of good and evil.
When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists.
The faculty of innate knowledge is to know good and evil.
The investigation of things is to do good and remove evil.
Just keep to these words of mine and instruct people according to their types, 
and there will not be any defect. This is indeed a task that penetrates both the 
higher and the lower levels. It is not easy to find people of sharp intelligence in the 
world. Even Yen Hui and Ming-tao [Ch’eng Hao] dared not assume that they could 
fully realize the original substance of the mind as soon as they apprehended the task 
How can we lightly expect this from people? People’s minds are dominated by habits. 
If we do not teach them concretely and sincerely to devote themselves to the task 
of doing good and removing evil right in their innate knowledge rather than merely 
imagining an original substance in a vacuum, all that they do will not be genuine and 
they will do no more than cultivate a mind of vacuity and quietness.* This defect is 
not a small matter and must be exposed as early as possible.” On that day both Ju- 
chung and I attained some enlightenment.
See Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings 
by Wang Tang-ming (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 243-245. It should 
be noted that for reasons of internal consistency, the Four-Sentence Teaching is rendered 
differently in my presentation.
*Like that of the Buddhists and Taoists.
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